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Hard Incompatibilism is the view that we lack the kind of free will that
could make us truly deserving of blame or praise for our actions. The
term ‘hard incompatibilism’ comes from Pereboom (2001) but versions
of the position have been defended by Voltaire, Diderot, Spinoza,
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Clarence Darrow, Paul Edwards, Ted
Honderich, Galen Strawson, Bruce Waller, Saul Smilansky, Richard
Double, and myself, among others. Arguments for hard incompatibi-
lism take roughly this form:
1. Some form of scientific naturalism (deterministic or indetermin-
istic) is true.2
2. The truth of some type of scientific naturalism entails that all
actions we perform are the result of processes that trace back to
factors beyond our control.
3. If an act is the result of processes that trace back to factors
beyond the agent’s control, then the agent does not deserve
1 I am grateful to Shaun Nichols and Derk Pereboom for valuable comments on
earlier drafts of this paper.
2 With the possible exception of Ted Honderich, all contemporary skeptics about
moral responsibility deny that we can be blameworthy or praiseworthy for our
actions whether or not determinism is true. The term ‘hard incompatibilism’ alludes
to what William James called the ‘hard determinism’ of Spinoza, Voltaire, Diderot,
and Edwards (the view that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility
and that determinism is true). But hard incompatibilism is not committed to the
truth of determinism.
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blame or praise for that act. (The Transfer of Non-Responsibil-
ity (TNR) Principle.3)
4. Therefore we cannot deserve praise or blame for our actions.
Since most philosophers accept scientific naturalism of some sort, the
recent debate has focused mostly on premises (2) and (3). ‘Event-causal’
libertarians reject premise (2), arguing that physical indeterminism does
grant us the type of control that can ground robust (desert-entailing)
moral responsibility.4 Compatibilists typically reject premise (3), offering
counterexamples to the ‘transfer of non-responsibility’ (TNR) principle.
I assume for this purposes of this paper that Pereboom’s ‘‘four-case-
argument’’ successfully defends hard incompatibilism against both
objections. Event-causal libertarians fail to show how physical indeter-
minism can provide the ultimate responsibility which they themselves
believe is necessary for blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. And
compatibilist counterexamples fail to undermine the intuitive plausibil-
ity of the TNR principle expressed in premise (3).5 Even if we grant
him these assumptions, however, Pereboom faces a further challenge. It
is not enough to assert that premises (1) and (2) in the argument are
true, and that premise (3) is highly intuitive. For hard incompatibilism
to be vindicated, Pereboom must give additional reasons to reject the
highly intuitive claim that people can be morally responsible for their
actions over the highly intuitive TNR principle. Section 2 of this paper
defends and develops this claim, and section 3 describes some ways
that this additional challenge can eventually be met. My argument
focuses on Pereboom for the sake of clarity, but I believe it applies to
all positions that deny robust (desert-entailing) moral responsibility.6
3 Fischer and Ravizza (1998) provide the following more careful formulation of this
principle: ‘‘(1) p obtains and no one is even partly morally responsible for p; and
(2) if p obtains, then q obtains, and no one is even partly morally responsible for
the fact that if p obtains, then q obtains; then (3) q obtains, and no one is even
partly morally responsible for q.’’ (p. 152) This ‘non-responsibility’ for the original
factors that produced the act is transferred to the act itself.
4 See Kane (1996, 1999) and Ekstrom (2000) for two examples.
5 One might in addition deny that incompatibilist principles like TNR were intuitive
even before compatibilist began hammering away at them. See Nahmias et al.
(2006) for evidence that appears to undermine claims that people are natural or
‘pretheoretic’ incompatibilists.
6 Indeed, suitably revised, the argument can apply to all positions the debate, includ-
ing compatibilist ones. Compatibilists, of course, face the challenge of showing that
the TNR principle is less intuitive than the claim that people cannot be morally
responsible for their behavior. Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me
to make this point. Speak (2004) may outline a similar framework for defending lib-
ertarianism.
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2. Hoisted on the Reflective Equilibrium Petard?
An example of the type of challenge I wish to develop is Pereboom’s
own objection to an argument by Ishtiyaque Haji. Haji’s (1999, 2002)
argument that determinism is incompatible with the existence of mor-
ally wrong actions can be expressed as follows:
1. Agent S has a moral obligation to perform [to refrain from per-
forming] action A if and only if it is morally wrong for S to
refrain from performing [to perform] A. (OW)
2. Agent S has a moral obligation to perform [to refrain from per-
forming] action A (where A ranges over omissions as well) only
if S has the ability to perform [refrain from performing] A. (K).
3. Therefore it is morally wrong for S to perform [refrain from
performing] A only if S has the ability to refrain from perform-
ing [perform] A. (WAP)
4. If determinism is true, then no one can has the ability to per-
form any act other than the act they actually perform.
5. Therefore determined worlds are devoid of wrong acts.7
There are several ways to attack this argument, but it is Pereboom’s
that interests me here. Pereboom acknowledges the intuitive force of
key principles (K) and (OW) but writes:
The degree to which Haji’s conclusions are unintuitive must be
weighed against how unintuitive it is to reject one or more of his pre-
mises….If the components of the theory derived from these principles
conform to our intuitions, that would provide theoretical support for
them. But if such derived components do not conform to our intu-
itions, that would to some extent disconfirm these principles. I don’t
see how a principle’s being an axiom in a moral theory would
immunize it from such disconfirming pressures. (Pereboom, 2001,
pp. 144–145).
According to Pereboom, the conclusion of Haji’s argument—‘nothing in
determined worlds is right, wrong, and obligatory’—is so unintuitive that
we should reexamine our initial acceptance of principles K and OW. To
place further pressure on these principles, Pereboom shows that together
7 This argument is drawn from Haji (2002), pp. 4–6. Pereboom (2001) discusses an
earlier version of the same argument, Haji (1999).
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with other premises to which Haji is committed, K and OW lead to two
other counterintuitive results (The Jalsity of GR and BW).8 Pereboom
writes that were we to learn that determinism was true, ‘‘it seems arbi-
trary to privilege absolutely K and OW over GR and BW—and over the
claim that judgments of moral obligation are sometimes true.’’
(Pereboom, 2001, p. 146) Pereboom does not indicate precisely how we
are to resolve this battle of conflicting intuitions, but it seems clear that
he favors a Rawlsian approach where we do our best to bring our intu-
itions and considered judgments on the matter into reflective equilibrium.
The problem for Pereboom is that the hard incompatibilist argument
is vulnerable to the same line of attack that Pereboom employs against
Haji. The unintuitiveness of the hard incompatibilist conclusion puts
‘‘disconfirming pressure’’ on the key incompatibilist premise—the TNR
principle. My analogy is apt if the following two claims are true: (1)
the hard incompatibilist conclusion is indeed unintuitive, and (2) the
TNR principle, like K and OW, is justified by an appeal to intuition.
Claim (1) is uncontroversial. The belief that adult humans can some-
times deserve blame or praise for their behavior—call this the ‘people
can be morally responsible’ (henceforth ‘PMR’) belief—is acknowl-
edged to be extremely intuitive even by those who conclude that it is
false.9 Pereboom writes about Haji’s conclusion that it ‘‘has the [unin-
tuitive] consequence…that nothing Hitler ever did was wrong.’’ No less
hard to swallow is the hard incompatibilist conclusion that Hitler did
not deserve blame or punishment for anything he ever did.
Claim (2), that the TNR principle is justified by an appeal to intui-
tion, requires more support. First, it is worth noting that whether or
not defenses of TNR must appeal to intuition, all contemporary incom-
patibilists have appealed to intuition in their defense of incompatibilist
principles. Van Inwagen, for example, writes the following about prin-
ciple beta—the ‘transfer of powerlessness’ principle that he later applies
explicitly to moral responsibility as well:10
I must confess that my belief in the validity of Beta has only two
sources, one incommunicable and the other inconclusive. The former
source is what philosophers are pleased to call ‘‘intuition’’.... The
8 GR: Sometimes actions that bring about the greatest good overall in worlds acces-
sible to S are right for S. BW: Sometimes, when S is blameworthy for performing
A, it was morally wrong for S to perform A.
9 Strawson (1986), a prominent skeptic about moral responsibility, believes that it is
virtually impossible to accept this conclusion entirely—at least without undertaking
a rigorous practice of meditation.
10 Van Inwagen writes that rule B—the transfer principle relating to moral responsi-
bility—‘‘perfectly parallels’’ Beta and in support of rule B refers the reader to his
defense of Beta (p.187–188).
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latter source is the fact that I can think of no instances of Beta that
have, or could possibly have, true premises and a false conclusion.
(Van Inwagen, 1983, pp. 97–99)
Note that van Inwagen’s two ‘‘sources’’ are really quite similar, since
someone with radically different intuitions from van Inwagen’s could
presumably come up with counterexamples rather easily. (Anyone with
the intuition that an agent in a particular case is morally responsible
for a state of affairs he clearly could not have prevented from obtain-
ing could simply use that case as a counterexample to van Inwagen’s
TNR principle (Rule B).11) And Pereboom, in defense of what he often
calls the incompatibilist intuition, employs what R.J. Wallace has called
a ‘generalization strategy’ that works like this. First, Pereboom presents
specific cases in which an agent is intuitively exempt from moral
responsibility. He then argues that there is no relevant difference
between these cases and all cases involving human action. Appeals to
intuition play a central role in this kind of argument. First, the general-
ization strategy cannot get off the ground unless the reader shares the
intuition about the non-responsibility of the agents in the first three
cases. Second, we must agree with Pereboom that there is no difference
relevant to moral responsibility between his third case and ordinary
cases of human behavior. The only way for us to evaluate whether the
differences are relevant to assignments of moral responsibility is to con-
sult our intuitions. Mele (2005), for example, argues that the intuition
the agents are not morally responsible in the first three cases may be
explained by the fact that there is a conscious manipulator in all those
cases. Pereboom responds by imagining a case where the manipulator
is replaced by machines that randomly form in space, and claims that
we intuitively judge that this agent is still not morally responsible. The
goal here is not to resolve this debate (in fact, I have assumed for the
purposes of this paper that Pereboom is victorious), but simply to
point out that the moves within it feature an explicit appeal to our
intuitions.12
Must incompatibilists appeal to intuition in their defense of the
TNR principle? That is a more difficult question, one that I will not
address in this paper in any detail.13 It is not clear to me how one
11 Consider a man, for example, who intuitively deemed himself blameworthy for his
great-grandfather’s treatment of slaves. This intuition would be a counterexample
to Rule B. Thanks to Eddy Nahmias and an anonymous referee for encouraging
me to develop this point.
12 See Pereboom (2001), esp. Chapter Four. Of course, intuitive plausibility is no less
relied upon in the cascade of counterexamples that compatibilists present in their
attempt to undermine incompatibilist principles.
13 Sommers (in preparation) provides a more developed discussion of this issue.
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could even begin to develop a plausible theory of moral responsibility
that disregarded intuition entirely. One might try to mount an argu-
ment that the concept of blameworthiness essentially involves the belief
that the act in question cannot be traced to factors beyond one’s con-
trol. But defending this claim in a non-question-begging manner would
be difficult since it appears that people do employ the concept of desert
without committing themselves to beliefs about the originating causes
of the behavior in question. One interpretation of the doctrine of origi-
nal sin, for example, is that human beings deserve punishment for the
sins of Adam and Eve. Whether or not this is a justified assignment of
desert is irrelevant to the present discussion. The point is that moral
responsibility does not conceptually involve anything like the TNR
principle.14 A straightforwardly naturalistic or reductionist defense of
TNR would seem to run afoul of the Moorean ⁄Humean arguments
that target naturalistic justifications of objective moral values. This is
because TNR is essentially a normative claim about the conditions
under which it is fair or appropriate to blame, praise, punish and
reward people.15 Indeed, one might see TNR as a moral axiom, which
is precisely what Haji calls his (Kantian) moral axioms K and OW. Of
course, it would take significantly more analysis to conclude that it is
impossible to defend the TNR principle without appealing to intuitions.
For now, however, it is enough to claim that no contemporary incom-
patibilist theory, including Pereboom’s, has even made this attempt.
If it is true that Pereboom’s conclusion is counterintuitive and that a
key principle in his argument relies on an appeal to intuition, then it
seems that Pereboom’s criticisms of Haji can be directed at his own
position. What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander: if Haji’s
unintuitive conclusion places disconfirming pressure on the intuitive
principles that lead him there, then Pereboom’s unintuitive conclusion
should place disconfirming pressure on the TNR principle. Pereboom
writes:
It is not clear that a position that denies GR, BW, and that actions
are sometimes morally obligatory, right, or wrong, while maintaining
14 Thanks to James Gibson for suggesting this example. The previous case (see note
10) can also support my claim here: the question ‘do the great-grandchildren of
slave-owners deserve any blame for their ancestors’ treatment of slaves before the
civil war?’ seems to be an open one. We might, or might not, find it intuitively
obvious that they cannot deserve blame or praise for the actions of our ancestors
(since they had no control over their ancestor’s actions), but the question does not
seem to involve a conceptual mistake.
15 See Nichols and Vargas (forthcoming). Vargas (2004) provides an excellent discus-
sion of the various normative dimensions regarding judgments about moral respon-
sibility.
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K and OW is superior to a view that, say, rejects OW and the claim
that actions can be morally obligatory but accepts GR, BW, K and
that actions are sometimes right or wrong. (Pereboom, 2001, p. 145.)
Similarly, one might write of Pereboom: ‘it is not clear that a position
that denies that people can be blameworthy or praiseworthy for any-
thing is superior to one that accepts that human adults can deserve
blame for bad behavior but denies that agents can only deserve blame
if their actions cannot be traced back to factors beyond their control.’
It seems just as arbitrary to ‘privilege absolutely’ the TNR belief over
the PMR belief.
Pereboom in the end does not claim to have decisively undermined
Haji’s argument, and notes that Haji’s position ‘‘might win out in the
end.’’ But his analysis requires Haji to give additional reasons other
than the intuitive plausibility of K and OW in support of his conclusion.
Hard incompatibilists face the same requirement. They must do
more than defend the intuitiveness of the TNR principle. They must
demonstrate that the unintuitiveness of the hard incompatibilist conclu-
sion does not place so much ‘disconfirming pressure’ on the TNR prin-
ciple that we have reason to reject it in spite of its intuitive
plausibility.16
3. Responding to the Challenge
Nichols (2008) helpfully distinguishes among three dimensions of the
free will debate: (1) the descriptive project, (2) the substantive project,
and (3) the prescriptive project. The descriptive project is to determine
the origins and the character of folk intuitions about moral responsibil-
ity. The substantive project is to determine whether the beliefs arising
from these intuitions are correct. And the prescriptive project is
(broadly speaking) to examine the ethical implications of what we learn
from the substantive project, and determine where we should go from
here. Skeptics about moral responsibility (myself included) have tended
to keep the substantive and prescriptive projects distinct. First, we
argue for truth of the claim that there is no such thing as moral respon-
sibility. Then we examine the implications of this conclusion and
16 Some may view Double (1998) as arguing for a similar conclusion. Double claims
that one’s conclusion about whether we have free will depends on the ‘metaphiloso-
phy’ that we embrace. I agree with Double that different metaphilosophies may
produce different conclusions about free will and moral responsibility, but I also
think that even two people who embrace a single metaphilosophy, including Dou-
ble’s favored ‘‘Philosophy as Continuous With Science,’’ may legitimately arrive at
different conclusions. What may make disagreement irresolvable is not that two
people have different metaphilosophies, but rather that two people have fundamen-
tally different starting intuitions about cases relating to moral responsibility.
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address questions like: how would, or should, denying moral responsi-
bility affect our metaethical beliefs, our interpersonal relationships, our
approach to criminal justice? What are the implications for issues relat-
ing to the meaning of life? ‘‘Happy hard determinists’’17 like Pereboom
tend to give rather optimistic answers to these questions, but the
answers are not intended to have bearing on the truth of hard incom-
patibilism. As one author rashly puts it: ‘‘Either we are capable of
being robustly morally responsible for our behavior or we are not;
metaphysical reality does not tailor itself to our hopes and needs.’’18 If
what I argue in this paper is correct, however, an analysis of the implica-
tions (metaethical, ethical, practical) of hard incompatibilism has direct
bearing on the truth, or plausibility, of the hard incompatibilist conclu-
sion. In other words, the prescriptive project (and certainly the descrip-
tive project) is an essential part of the substantive project. If the hard
incompatibilist conclusion has unintuitive metaethical, ethical, or per-
haps even pragmatic consequences, then we have more reason to reject
TNR and preserve PMR, the belief that people can be morally responsi-
ble for their behavior. Since our intuitions ultimately ground TNR, it
seems that the method of wide reflective equilibrium is the best way,
arguably the only way, to decide which belief we ought to accept. And
we cannot employ this method without consulting our feelings and intu-
itions about the implications of the hard incompatibilist conclusion.
Of course, reflective equilibrium may ultimately lead us to accept
TNR and reject PMR—indeed, I believe it will, although I cannot
argue for that claim here. I will conclude, however, by suggesting some
factors that must be considered when deliberating over which of the
two intuitive beliefs we have more reason to reject.
1. Which belief is stronger? Which is more difficult psychologically
to give up?
2. Which belief better coheres with other well justified beliefs,
moral and non-moral?
3. Which belief can more plausibly be ‘explained away’—in other
words, accounted for in such a way that does not require that
the belief is true?
4. Which intuition or belief has more pragmatic value?
17 Saul Smilansky’s (2008) term to describe the overly sanguine (in his view) philoso-
phers who ‘‘welcome the demise of moral responsibility.’’
18 Sommers, 2007, p. 342.
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Answering these questions and relating them explicitly to the sub-
stantive arguments about moral responsibility is the additional ‘work’
I refer to in the title of this paper. The good news is that some of
this work has been done, although perhaps not with the goal of
achieving reflective equilibrium in mind.19 Experimental philosophers
are at work trying to shed light on (1),20 and research in cultural
anthropology, experimental economics, and social psychology has
bearing on this question as well.21 Regarding (2), I have already noted
that Pereboom presents an optimistic view of the ethical implications
of hard incompatibilism. A vindication of this optimistic perspective
would remove some of the ‘disconfirming pressure’ from the TNR
principle.22 As for (3), several authors have argued that the belief in
PMR can be ‘explained away’ with an account that incorporates both
evolutionary and cultural factors.23 If the same cannot be said for the
TNR belief, then we arguably have more reason to accept it over the
belief in PMR. Question (4) has yet to receive a comprehensive
analysis, although a number of authors have addressed the practical
day-to-day implications of denying moral responsibility, at least
tangentially.24
So we do not need to start from scratch. But all of this work
must be developed and formulated more carefully, and it must be
related explicitly to the substantive question of whether or not we
can be morally responsible. Until this is done, one may legitimately
find every premise in the (valid) hard incompatibilist argument to be
true or intuitively plausible yet still reject the hard incompatibilist
conclusion.25
19 But see Nichols (2007) for an example of bringing prescriptive and descriptive con-
siderations to bear on our ‘all things considered’’ judgments about moral responsi-
bility. Nichols presents preliminary evidence that in his view favors a compatibilist
conclusion.
20 See Nahmias et al. (2006) and Nichols and Knobe (2007) for representative exam-
ples.
21 The experiments in Henrich et al. (2004), in which anthropologists run ultimatum
and public goods games on subjects from 15 small scale societies has, I believe,
deep relevance to the key question of whether intuitions about fairness and blame-
worthiness shared across cultures.
22 See also Sommers (2007a).
23 See Sommers (2007b), Greene and Cohen (2004), and Nichols (2004).
24 See among others, Honderich (1983), Wolf (1981), Kane (1996), Sommers (2005),
and Smilansky (2000).
25 Zimmerman (1987) jokingly accuses Nagel in ‘‘Moral Luck’’ of accepting the pre-
mises in a valid argument while denying the conclusion. Perhaps Nagel had consid-
erations like these in mind when he allowed himself to (seemingly) do this.
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